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PERFECTION AND IMPERFECTION OF JOSEF SEIFERT’S 
THEORY OF PURE PERFECTIONS 
 
Rogelio Rovira

 
 
“Now if cattle, horses or lions had hands and were able to draw with their hands 
and perform works like men, horses like horses and cattle like cattle would draw 
the forms of gods, and make their bodies just like the body each of them had… 
Africans say their gods are snub-nosed and black, Thracians blue-eyed and 
red-haired.”1 The criticism levelled by the pre-Socratic philosopher Xenophanes 
against the anthropomorphic way of representing the divine in his era has been 
constantly reiterated throughout the history of thought. Is it not really man who 
“created God in his own image and likeness,” as we read on the sarcophagus of 
the nineteenth-century atheist thinker Ludwig Feuerbach? Is not all idea of God’s 
being an idol, as the contemporary Catholic philosopher Jean-Luc Marion appears 
to suggest?
2
 
The question as to whether and how a finite understanding like ours can 
adequately conceive the infinite being of God is perhaps the central problem of 
philosophical theology and of metaphysics in general. If our knowledge were 
essentially reduced to analysis of purely inner-worldly being, metaphysics (as a 
science of being qua being as well as a rational science of God) would be 
completely impossible. To provide an answer to this fundamental problem, Josef 
Seifert has had the perspicacity to direct his gaze to an ancient doctrine of 
medieval origin: the so-called doctrine of pure perfections. It is no exaggeration 
to assert that Josef Seifert is the foremost contemporary defender of this 
metaphysical theory of simpliciter simplices perfections, and the one who has 
managed to extract the greatest philosophical riches from it.
3
 
                                                             
 ROGELIO ROVIRA, Universidad Complutense de Madrid. 
1“Xenophanes,” Frag. B15, B 16, in Daniell W. Graham (ed. and transl.), The Texts of 
Early Greek Philosophy. The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major 
Presocratics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 109-10. 
2See Jean-Luc Marion, Dieu sans l‘Etre (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991). 
3Josef Seifert deals with the doctrine of pure perfections in many of his works, for example: 
“Gott und die Sittlichkeit innerweltlichen Handelns. Kritische philosophische Reflexionen 
über den Einfluß anthropomorpher und agnostischer Gottesvorstellungen auf Ethik und 
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In the following analysis, I propose to carry out three tasks. First, to give a 
brief account of the essence of pure perfections as described by the first 
philosopher who grasped them with full philosophical awareness, Anselm of 
Canterbury, and by the thinker who perhaps entered most deeply into their nature, 
Duns Scotus. Second, to identify the corrections and clarifications that Josef 
Seifert has introduced into the traditional doctrine of pure perfections, as well as 
                                                                                                                                          
Moraltheologie,” Forum Katholische Theologie, I, 1 (1985), 27-47; Essere e persona. 
Verso una fondazione fenomenologica di una metafisica classica e personalistica. 
Translated by Rocco Buttiglione (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1989), cap. V, 203-49; 
“Transcendentals and Pure Perfections,” in H. Burkhardt-B. Smith (ed.), Handbook of 
Metaphysics and Ontology (München: Philosophia Verlag, 1991, 2, 909-11; “Essere 
persona come perfezione pura. Il Beato Duns Scoto e una nuova metafisica personalistica,” 
in M. Sánchez Sorondo (ed.), Peri psych s, De homine, Antropologia: Nuovi approcci 
(Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Filosofia. Pontificia Università Lateranense; Collana 
“Dialogo di Filosofia” 11, Roma: Herder, 1994), 57-75; “Die natürliche Gotteserkenntnis 
als menschlicher Zugang zu Gott,” in Franz Breid (ed.), Der Eine und Dreifaltige Gott als 
Hoffnung des Menschen zur Jahrtausendwende (Steyr: Ennsthaler Verlag, 2001), 9-102; 
Gott als Gottesbeweis. Eine phänomenologische Neubegründung des ontologischen 
Arguments (Heidelberg: Universtitätsverlag C. Winter, 1996, 20002); “The Idea of the 
Good as the Sum-total of Pure Perfections. A New Personalistic Reading of Republic VI 
and VII,” in: G. Reale and S. Scolnikov (eds.), New Images of Plato. Dialogues on the Idea 
of the Good (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2002), 407-424. “El amor como 
perfección pura: una metafísica del amor como himno filosófico del amor,” Humanitas 
(Anuario del Centro de Estudios Humanísticos, Universidad Autónoma del Nuevo León) 
2004, 65-82; “A vontade como perfeição pura e a nova concepção não-eudemonística do 
amor segundo Duns Scotus,“ Veritas (Porto Alegre), 50 (2005), 51-84; “Scotus’ Analyse 
der ‘reinen Vollkommenheiten’ und zeitgenössische Religionsphilosophie,” in R. 
Hofmeister Pich (ed.), New Essays on Metaphysics as “Scientia transcendens”. 
(Proceedings of the Second International Conference of Medieval Philosophy, held at the 
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), Porto Alegre-Brazil, 15-18 
August, 2006, Louvain-La-Neuve: Fédération internationale des Instituts d'Études 
Médiévales, 2007), 249-282. Erkenntnis des Vollkommenen. Wege der Vernunft zu Gott 
(Bonn: Lepanto Verlag, 2010). Spanish translation by Pedro Jesús Teruel, with revisions 
and aditions by Josef Seifert, Conocimiento de Dios por la vías de la razón y del amor 
(Madrid: Ediciones Encuentro, 2013). 
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to indicate the main ways in which he has used or applied this ancient theory. In 
this way, I shall consider the “perfection” of Seifert’s theory of pure perfections. 
Third, to indicate issues, which remain open within this metaphysical doctrine 
and the broad scope Seifert has given to it. In this way, I shall discuss the 
“imperfection” of Seifert’s theory of pure perfections, not in the sense that it is in 
any way flawed, but in the sense that there are aspects, which still need to be 
developed. 
 
I. The Essence of Pure Perfections as Described by Anselm and Duns Scotus 
 
As Josef Seifert notes, Anselm of Canterbury (also known as Anselm of Aosta) 
was the first to grasp with philosophical clarity the essence of the so-called pure 
perfections.
4
 In Chapter XV of Monologion, Anselm sought a criterion for 
discerning, among the different predicates we attribute to things, which ones are 
substantively (substantialiter) or properly characteristic of the divine essence.
5
 
To find a solution, Anselm first distinguished two basic types of predication: 
the relative and the absolute. In the relative, attributed perfection is valued in 
terms of how much and to what degree of excellence an object possesses this 
quality. With the absolute, the predicated perfection is judged according to the 
ontological dignity of the quality in question. 
Relative predication involves comparing the extent and degree of excellence 
to which an attribute is possessed by two or more beings. For this reason, no 
relative or comparative predicate will be able to describe the divine nature 
adequately. It is certainly true that we can say that God is, in Anselm’s own words, 
“the highest of all beings, or greater than those which have been created by 
Him.”6 However, this does not describe God’s nature in itself, for if the term of 
                                                             
4See Seifert, “Transcendentals and Pure Perfections,” 910, and Essere e Persona, cap V, 
216. 
5For what follows see Anselm of Canterbury, Monologion, cap. XV, in St. Anselmi 
Cantuarienses Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia (ed. F. S. Schmitt), Edinburghi: apud Thomas 
Nelson et Filios, 1946, I, 28-29. English translation by Sidney Norton Deane, in St. 
Anselm, Proslogium; Monologium; An appendix in behalf of the fool by Gaunilon; and 
Cur deus homo (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1939), 61-64; and Josef 
Seifert, Essere e Persona, cap V, 215-218. 
6Anselm, Monologion, cap. XV, 28 (English translation, 61). 
56 ROGELIO ROVIRA  
 
 
 
Journal of East-West Though 
 
comparison, namely everything that has been made by God, never existed, then 
God would not be the supreme essence at all. Moreover, He would not have lost 
any of His ontological greatness and dignity. The same is true of other, similar 
relative predicates. 
The positive criterion for the attributes of the substance of the divine essence 
must be sought, then, within an absolute predication of perfections. Absolute 
predication, in fact, involves comparing the possession of a perfection by a being 
with the same being not possessing this quality; in such a way, that we can say it 
is better (or not better) for this being to have such an attribute than not to have it. 
Moreover, it is precisely within the absolute predicates that Anselm discovered a 
fundamental difference. There are, on the one hand, cases where, for some beings, 
it is better not to have a certain predicate than to have it, even if this predicate is 
present in its highest degree. Anselm says of a predicate or perfection of this kind 
that, “in some cases, ‘not to be it’ is better than ‘to be it’ (non ipsum in aliquo 
melius est quam ipsum).” On the other hand, there are cases where it is absolutely 
better for an object to possess a given predicate than not to possess it. Anselm 
suggests that, in the case of a predicate or perfection of this type, “to be it is in 
general better than not to be it (ipsum omnino melius est quam non ipsum).”7 
The opposition between “to be it” (ipsum esse) and “not to be it” (non ipsum 
esse) does not refer to the opposition between a perfection and its respective 
imperfection, but rather to the opposition between a perfection and its respective 
absence or privation. Anselm’s discovery specifically involves showing that the 
absence of some perfections is, in some beings, a perfection, while the lack of 
certain perfections is necessarily an imperfection. To use Anselm’s own examples, 
although it might be better for something to be gold, it is better for man not to be 
gold than to be gold, as man is much better than gold. If he were gold, he would 
be of lower nature. On the other hand, to be wise is better than not to be wise, 
“for everything that is not wise, simply in so far as it is not wise, is less than what 
is wise, since everything that is not wise would be better if it were wise.”8  
Conditioned absolute predicates, i.e. those it is better in some cases not to 
have than to have, are termed mixed or limited perfections (limitatae 
perfectiones). The root of the limitation they encapsulate explains the fact that, in 
some beings, it is better not to possess them than to possess them. On the other 
                                                             
7Anselm, Monologion, cap. XV, 28 (English translation, 62). 
8Anselm, Monologion, cap. XV, 28 (English translation, 63). 
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hand, unconditioned absolute predicates, i.e. those it is unconditionally better to 
have than not to have are termed pure perfections or perfections in an absolute 
way (perfectiones simpliciter). The fact that possessing them is absolutely better 
than not possessing them shows that, in fact, these perfections do not contain in 
himself or herself any imperfection or limitation; they are perfections par 
excellence. 
In this light, it is easy to establish a positive criterion for the perfections, 
which correspond properly or substantively to divine nature. Anselm himself 
explains it as follows: “As it is impious to suppose that the substance of the 
supreme Nature is anything, than which what is not it is in any way better, it must 
be true that this substance is whatever is, in general, better than what is not it.” 
The essence of God can be seen, therefore, as all pure perfections in the highest 
degree. “Hence,” Anselm concludes, “this Being must be living, wise, powerful, 
and all-powerful, true, just, blessed, eternal, and whatever, in like manner, is 
absolutely better than what is not it.”9 
According to Josef Seifert, Duns Scotus is the philosopher who perhaps 
explored the essence of the pure perfections in the most depth and, through 
progressive refining, attempted to distinguish the pure from the mixed perfections 
most clearly.
10
 As Seifert states: “Scotus’ subtle analyses of the pure perfections 
remain as the most significant historical contribution to a phenomenology of the 
pure perfections.”11 
Duns Scotus summarises the description of the nature of pure perfections 
offered by Anselm in these terms: “A pure perfection is said to be something 
which is better in everything than what is not it (Perfectio simpliciter est quae in 
quolibet est melius ipsum quam non ipsum).” Alternatively - “A pure perfection is 
that which it is better to possess than not to possess in whatever possesses it 
(Perfectio simpliciter est quae in quolibet habente ipsam melius est ipsam habere 
quam non ipsam habere).”12 In the opinion of the Subtle Doctor, however, two 
                                                             
9Anselm, Monologion, cap. XV, 29 (English translation, 64). 
10See Seifert, “Transcendentals and Pure Perfections,” 910, Essere e Persona, cap V, 218 
and “Scotus’ Analyse der ‘reinen Vollkommenheiten’,” 251-262. 
11Seifert, Essere e Persona, cap V, 231. 
12The first definition is found in Tractatus de primo principio, cap. IV, Tertia conclusio; the 
second one in Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q. 5, n. 13. For what follows see, besides the 
mentioned passages of Duns Scotus’s works, Seifert, Essere e Persona, cap. 5, 218-20 and 
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possible misunderstandings obscure the true meaning of these Anselmian 
formulae. 
The first possible ambiguity concerns that which is to be considered a pure 
perfection and that which is not. Anselm himself had already considered this 
possible misunderstanding, at least implicitly. The question is that the opposition 
between “to be it” (ipsum esse) and “not to be it” (non ipsum esse) cannot be 
understood as a contrary opposition, that is, as an opposition between something 
positive and something negative. If it were understood in this way, Anselm's 
description would be false and even absurd. Rather, the opposition between ipsum 
and non ipsum has to be understood as an incompatibility between something 
positive and another something, which is also positive. This latter is called non 
ipsum only on the grounds of its incompatibility with the former. In order to avoid 
this confusion, Duns Scotus proposes a more appropriate characterisation of a 
pure perfection as that which, in any being, is better than everything else is 
incompossible or incompatible with it (in quolibet melior quocumque sibi 
incompossibili). 
The second possible misunderstanding refers to that to which a pure 
perfection is ascribed, to the “bearer” of a pure perfection. The question is that the 
term “in any being” (in quolibet) in Anselm’s description cannot be interpreted as 
meaning “for any being” (cuilibet). If this were the case, Anselm’s formula would 
be false. According to the famous example by Duns Scotus, it is no better for a 
dog to be wise than not to be wise. Interpreted in this way, Anselmian description 
would mention the relationship of a pure perfection to a certain nature, which, by 
its own limitation, may be incompatible with such a pure perfection. The 
excellence of such perfection prevents the nature in question from being such a 
nature, so to speak. Therefore, Anselm’s statement has to be understood in the 
sense of a relationship between a pure perfection and a nature not yet determined, 
which the Subtle Doctor, following the scholastic tradition, calls substance or 
subject (suppositum), i.e. something which subsists (subsistens), but whose 
subsistence is considered independent of the nature in which or of which it is a 
substance. To avoid this ambiguity, a pure perfection can be more properly 
defined as that which, in any substance, regardless of its subsistence as 
                                                                                                                                          
pp. 232-41 and Allan B. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the 
Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (St. Bonaventure-New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1946), 
162-8. 
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determined by a particular nature, is better than anything incompatible with it is. 
In the light of these considerations, Duns Scotus can summarise the results of 
his research with a new characterisation of the essence of pure perfections. This 
description, which Scotus considers more appropriate to the thing itself and less 
equivocal than that proposed by Anselm, reads as follows: “A pure perfection is 
whatever is absolutely and without qualification better than anything 
incompatible with it (Perfectio simpliciter est quae est simpliciter et absolute 
melius quocumque incompossibili).”13 
The essence of pure perfections described in this way leads Duns Scotus to 
make four new discoveries concerning the essentially necessary properties of pure 
perfections. 
First: All pure perfections are mutually compatible.
14
 The argument 
advanced by the Subtle Doctor develops as follows. No pure perfection can be 
incompatible with another pure perfection because, if this were the case, the same 
perfection would be both better and worse than the other, and vice versa. The 
impossibility that one and the same thing could be less perfect than it could 
indirectly proves the fact all pure perfections must be compatible. 
Second: All pure perfections admit of infinity.
15
 The proof of Duns Scotus is 
as follows. If a pure perfection does not admit of infinity, then it would have to 
exceed or be better than what is infinite, since a pure perfection is better than 
what is incompatible with it. However, nothing can exceed or be better than what 
is infinite. Thus, all pure perfections admit of infinity. 
Third: Pure perfections are irreducible simple (simpliciter simplices),
16
 that 
is to say, they cannot be reduced neither to anything simpler nor to each other, 
and are therefore indefinable. 
Four: Every pure perfection is “communicable,”17 that is, several subjects 
can share a pure perfection. 
Finally, Duns Scotus considers that pure perfections are properly 
“Transcendentals,” not in the sense of being properties coextensive with being, 
but rather in the sense of being properties not limited to spheres or categories of 
                                                             
13John Duns Scotus, Tractatus de primo principio, cap. IV, Tertia conclusio. 
14See Scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q. 5, n. 8. 
15See Scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q. 5, n. 9. 
16See Scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q. 1, n. 4. 
17See John Duns Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, I, dist. 2, q. 7, n. 39. 
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beings and in the sense that they lack essential limitations or restrictions. In this 
way, Scotus classifies these Transcendentals into three groups: properties which 
characterise all beings (such as ens, unum, verum or bonum), properties which 
only some beings possess but which are in themselves formally infinite (such as 
being a person, knowledge, freedom, etc.) and properties which can only be 
ascribed to the Infinite Being (such as necessary real existence, absolute infinity, 
omniscience and omnipotence). Thus, as Seifert says, “all Transcendentals are 
necessarily also pure perfections, and all pure perfections are eo ipso 
Transcendentals.”18 
 
II. The “Perfection” of Seifert’s Theory of Pure Perfections 
 
What corrections or clarifications has Josef Seifert introduced to this traditional 
doctrine of pure perfections and how has he used and applied it? I will discuss the 
“perfection” of Seifert’s theory of pure perfections by giving a brief account, in 
order, of his nine major contributions to this theory. 
1. The first contribution concerns the need for a more precise and exact 
determination of the nature or essence of pure perfections. 
In the first place, Seifert notes that Scotus’ distinction between in quolibet, or 
suppositum (substance), and cuilibet, or specific nature, is superfluous and 
misleading in the way it is applied to the description of pure perfections. There 
are indeed certain limited subjects, not just their specific natures, for which 
possessing a pure perfection is not necessarily better than not possessing it. For 
example, it would be absurd for the subject of human nature (in quolibet) to 
possess rather than not to possess a pure perfection such as eternity. Besides, 
although it is true, to a certain extent, the same suppositum can be the bearer of 
different natures, this “plasticity” or “flexibility,” so to speak, is not infinite. No 
finite subject can bridge the gap between finite and infinite nature. Therefore, in 
Duns Scotus’ formula, the expression “anything incompatible” (quocumque 
incompossibile) with a pure perfection must leave open the question of whether it 
is a subject or a nature, or both.
19
 
In the second place, Seifert notes that the Scotus’ description of a pure 
perfection as that which is better than anything incompatible with it can only be 
                                                             
18Seifert, Essere e Persona, cap V, 212. 
19See Seifert, Essere e Persona, cap. 5, 220-2. 
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understood by considering the perfection in question in itself, and not in relation 
to other possible pure perfections. An intelligent nature, in Seifert’s example, is 
certainly more perfect than an unintelligent or less intelligent nature, but only 
with regard to intelligence. The most intelligent but evil nature is less perfect than 
a less intelligent nature which is nevertheless morally good. Seifert therefore 
gives the following formula for describing a pure perfection:  “A pure perfection 
is such, that the being which possess it and which is compatible with it is, from 
the point of view of that perfection, necessarily more perfect than a being which 
in fact does not possess the given perfection, or by essence cannot possess it.”20 
Finally, in the third place, Seifert thinks that it is possible to provide a new 
description of the pure perfections, which more adequately encapsulates the 
essential characteristic of their absolute goodness or their absolute “being better,” 
i.e. the fact that they are better in an absolute way. The proposed formula says, “A 
pure perfection is such that it is impossible to surpass it without possessing it.”21 
2. The second major improvement Seifert made in the theory of pure 
perfections concerns the ways in which the actual existence of such perfections 
can be identified. 
Josef Seifert begins by noting that pure perfections possess an objective, 
essential necessity. They are indeed Urgegebenheiten, irreducible realities. Thus, 
their existence can be ascertained, according to Seifert, in two ways: indirectly, 
by a negative proof, and directly, by a positive insight. 
The negative proof for the existence of pure perfections is, as Seifert calls it, 
a sort of objectivist “transcendental deduction.” It is because, since pure 
perfections are irreducible data, they are also “undeniable truths” in the sense that 
every negation of them necessarily entails a contradiction, by reintroducing the 
datum in question. To hold that there are only mixed perfections, or surpassable 
attributes of being as such, implies defending that it is absolutely better to possess 
a surpassable perfection than not to possess it, or that it is absolutely better to be 
limited than to be unlimited. However, this is tantamount to saying that a pure 
perfection is not really a pure perfection. This contradiction therefore provides 
indirect proof of the fact that there are indeed pure perfections.
22
 
However, definitive evidence which refutes any denial of the existence of 
                                                             
20Seifert, Essere e Persona, cap. 5, 222. 
21See Seifert, Essere e Persona, cap. 5, 224. 
22See Seifert, Essere e Persona, cap. 5, 225-8. 
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pure perfections, as Seifert points out, consists of rendering “intuitively evident 
that the perfectiones simpliciter really do include perfections in an absolute sense 
higher than any which are possible in natures or beings which lack these pure 
perfections or which are incompatible with them.”23 In this case, we are not 
dealing with a simple psychological impossibility of thinking something “higher 
than…” Rather, we are referred back to the objective material lawfulness, which 
we encounter in perfections such as being a person, being wisdom or simply 
being.
24
 
3. The question of the existence of pure perfections leads us to the third 
major development introduced by Josef Seifert in the metaphysical theory of pure 
perfections. It concerns the problem of knowledge of these perfections. 
At this point, Seifert separates drastically from the Scotistic epistemological 
conception. Duns Scotus maintains that the human spirit first grasps the essential 
form or ratio formalis of a pure perfection by experience, and then abstracts from 
the experienced perfection all the limitations it finds. The human mind then 
ascribes the purified essential form to God in a most perfect manner 
(perfectissime). Seifert simply considers such a conception impossible. He asks 
how the human spirit can abstract from the limitations he finds in experience 
without in some manner knowing how to distinguish the limited instances in 
which a pure perfection is realised from the pure perfection itself?
25
 
Far from any idea of grasping essential forms contained in the phantasmata, 
Seifert, in accordance with his manifold epistemological investigations and 
inquiries on the methods of realist phenomenology, defends an intuitive 
knowledge of pure perfections. This intuitive knowledge is certainly not direct, 
but mediated “in the mirror” of others. This “mediated immediate” knowledge is, 
in Seifert’s own words, an “indirect knowledge in which other, originally hidden 
essences, are reflected and co-given in what is more immediately present to us, 
sometimes as their perfect form, other times as their intelligible ‘opposites’.”26 In 
fact, in the world, we only experience immediately finite forms of pure 
perfections, but at the same time, we understand the formal essence of these pure 
                                                             
23Seifert, Essere e Persona, cap. 5, 229. 
24See Seifert, Essere e Persona, cap. 5, 228-30. 
25See Seifert, Essere e Persona, cap. 5, 231. 
26 Josef Seifert, Discours des Méthodes: The Methods of Philosophy and Realist 
Phenomenology, (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2009), 34. 
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perfections in their purity and infinity. Using a distinction by Bonaventura, in the 
same way as Seifert, we can say that pure perfections are not ‘intuited’ as such in 
the immediate objects of our concrete experience, but ‘contuited’ on that intuitive 
contact with reality. Alternatively, as Seifert himself says, “the perfect form of the 
pure perfections is only co-given to our human mind with the finite and imperfect 
forms of them which we experience immediately.” 27 
4. This conception of knowledge, both of the existence and the essence of 
pure perfections, gives Josef Seifert occasion to understand more deeply some of 
the essential characteristics of the perfectiones simpliciter, especially their 
admission of the infinite. This is his fourth major advance in the doctrine of the 
pure perfections. 
It is not just the case that every pure perfection is not essentially limited and 
is therefore compatible with the infinite, but above all that a pure perfection is 
only fully itself when it is infinite. Our co-given insight into a pure perfection 
allows us to understand that its essential form definitively contradicts all those 
limitations in which the pure perfection in question is accessible to us. The 
primary and genuine form of every pure perfection is its infinite form. According 
to Seifert, by rejecting a certain positive knowledge, albeit indirect, of the 
archetype of a pure perfection, in the final analysis the Scotistic epistemology of 
pure perfections is not able to justify this important insight: that the pure essential 
form of a pure perfection is formally infinite, even if we can only access it in its 
finite forms.
28
 
In this light, the mutual compatibility of all pure perfections is evidence that 
the pure perfections are not merely compossible with each other, but rather that 
there is a profound inner union between them, in such a way that in the Infinite 
Being all perfections are united.
29
 
Likewise, the irreducible simplicity of pure perfections means they are 
ultimate and simple data, which cannot be reduced to something else. Pure 
perfections, as far as they are absolutely infinite, and not merely “infinite within 
the finite,” are in no way composed of parts or moments.30 
5. The fifth major achievement within the theory of pure perfections involves 
                                                             
27Seifert, Discours des Méthodes, 35. 
28See Seifert, Essere e Persona, cap. 5, 238-41. 
29See Seifert, Essere e Persona, cap. 5, 232-4. 
30See Seifert, Essere e Persona, cap. 5, 244-5 and 235-7. 
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Seifert’s arguments to prove that properties like life, free will, to be a person and 
love are in fact pure perfections. 
Life is a pure perfection where it is seen not as bios, that is, not as organic 
vegetal, animal or human life which is inseparable from a body, but rather it is 
understood in the sense of ‘zoee.’ That is, the most universal essence of life, for it 
is absolutely impossible to surpass any limited form of life in perfection without 
living. For this reason, according to Seifert, Aristotle himself attributed life to 
“the unmoved mover.”31 
Following the deep insights of Scotus, Seifert demonstrates that free will is 
also a pure perfection because of both its object and its motivation. The object of 
free will is not restricted to any particular good, but is extended to good itself. 
Besides, free will can be motivated not only by the only subjectively satisfactory, 
but also by the intrinsic value.
32
 
To be a person is certainly absolutely better than not to be it. The perfections 
of being, in other words actuality, self-possession, autonomy and self-sufficiency, 
are fulfilled in the person in a higher way than in non-personal beings. Thus, the 
person is the being in the primary and archetypal sense. Moreover, the perfection 
of being a person admits infinity in such a way that even God must be a personal 
being. For, as Seifert asks: How could a non-personal being create us? How could 
God be a just judge and have mercy on us without knowing and loving, acts 
which only persons can carry out?
33
 
Finally, love is also, according to Josef Seifert, a pure perfection. Among the 
various arguments he brings forth in favour of this thesis, I will mention only one 
direct insight: love in the sense of self-donation of one person to another is a 
perfection absolutely insurmountable by a being incapable of love.
34
 
6. Seifert’s sixth major contribution to the doctrine of pure perfections is his 
defence of the thesis, which suggests that knowledge of pure perfections is a 
necessary condition of any knowledge of God. 
                                                             
31See Josef Seifert, What is Life? On the Originality, Irreducibility and Value of Life 
(Amsterdam, Rodopi, Value Inquiry Book Series, 51, 1997), 20-4. 
32See Seifert, “A vontade como perfeição pura,” 78-80. 
33See Seifert, “Essere persona come perfezione pura,” 66-75, and Essere e Persona, cap. 9, 
326-408. 
34See Seifert, “El amor como perfección pura,” 68-78, and Conocimiento de Dios, 
202-213. 
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According to Seifert, on the one hand, mixed perfections are primarily and in 
a certain sense exclusively realised in finite beings, whereas pure perfections, by 
being formally infinite, can only be properly realised in God himself, the Infinite 
Being.  On the other hand, whereas no pure perfection can be fulfilled in an 
absolute sense in any finite being, mixed perfections can be attributed to God 
only via negationis and via supereminentia. In other words, God does not possess 
them directly, but He does retain every perfection present in them. In this sense, 
as Seifert notes, mixed perfections are attributed to God via negativa, and to 
creatures via affirmationis, whereas pure perfections are attributed to God via 
positiva, and to finite beings via negativa.
35
 
This is the basis upon which Seifert responds to the argument, commonly 
presented by philosophers today, that all statements about God are 
anthropomorphic. They cannot preserve God's “absolute transcendence,” either 
with respect to our knowledge or with respect to His actions in the world. 
This view can be countered by the argument that pure perfections which are 
attributed to God via positiva cannot entail anything “human, all too human” 
because they are, by essence, infinite. Moreover, applying the via negationis to 
God, far from being an anthropomorphic way of speaking about Him, involves 
denying that mixed perfections exist in God, because of the imperfection which 
these perfections carry in themselves. Finally, as Seifert explicitly states, the 
ultimate consequence of the thesis that all statements about God can only be 
anthropomorphic is “not only the old deism, but a more radical agnosticism, 
which, by its abandonment of any claim to objective knowledge about God, can 
no longer be clearly distinguished from atheism.”36 
7. Josef Seifert’s seventh major development within the theory of pure 
perfections involves proposing a new defence of the famous quarta via of 
Thomas Aquinas. He bases this on the discovery of the constitutive essence of 
pure perfections.
37
 
Far from regarding this proof as the weakest of Aquinas’ five ways of 
proving the existence of God, as is usually the case, Seifert suggests that this 
                                                             
35See Seifert, Essere e Persona, cap. 5, 241. 
36Seifert, Erkenntnis dês Vollkommenen, 171. See also “Scotus’ Analyse der ‘reinen 
Vollkommenheiten’”, 262-282. 
37See Seifert, Essere e Persona, cap. 12, 488-503, and Erkenntnis dês Vollkommenen, 
147-50. 
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proof constitutes the core of any cosmological argument. As is well known, the 
proof is taken from the gradation of perfections to be found in the worldly beings, 
and is built on the concept that “’more’ and ‘less’ are predicated of different 
things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the 
maximum.”38  
Aquinas, in Seifert's opinion, does not clearly distinguish in his formulation 
of the proof between a relative and an absolute maximum, or between necessarily 
limited perfections and pure perfections which are potentially infinite, but which 
appear only to a limited degree in the beings of our experience. However, his 
proof is completely valid in the sense that not only the essential limitation of 
mixed perfections but also the limitations of the embodiment of all pure 
perfections in the world necessarily imply both the contingency of essence and 
the contingency of existence of worldly beings. Why is this particular being 
limited in this precise way, rather than in any of an infinite number of other 
possible ways? Moreover, if this particular being can have more or less of any of 
the perfections it possesses, why does it exist instead of not existing at all? 
In this way, Seifert argues, the fact that it is impossible to explain limited 
degrees of perfection in terms of limited beings proves the existence of an 
infinitely good God. Only an infinitely perfect Being, “something than which 
nothing greater can be thought”, can be the ultimate explanation for being. 
8. It is precisely this conception of God’s Being as “that greater than which 
nothing can be thought” which leads us to the eighth major improvement made by 
Seifert in the theory of pure perfections. I refer to his sound defence of the 
so-called ontological argument, which he regards as the strongest proof for the 
existence of God, though also the most difficult to comprehend.
39
 
God ‘s essence, Seifert suggests, contains all pure perfections, all those 
attributes it is absolutely better to possess than not to possess, and those which it 
is better to possess than to possess anything incompatible with them. Thus, God’s 
perfection includes not only the absolute plenitude of reality and of being, but all 
personal and moral perfections. God is not only “that greater than which nothing 
can be thought,” but also “that better than which nothing can be thought.” 
In the defence presented by Seifert, this description of God’s Being is not a 
mere idea or simple, nominal definition. It is instead true knowledge of God’s 
                                                             
38Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 2, a. 3. 
39See Seifert, Gott als Gottesbeweis, especially V. Teil, 527 ff. 
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nature, however imperfect and indirectly obtained from our experience of the 
world this knowledge may be. Moreover, because God is God, and actual 
existence is inseparable from the highest perfection, God necessarily exists. 
Anselm’s immortal insight that a pure idea of supreme perfection would not be 
“that greater and better than which nothing can be thought” if it did not actually 
exist, is interpreted by Seifert as follows: God’s infinite perfection, which 
includes full possession of the ratio formalis of all pure perfections in their 
infinite form, would not be perfection at all if it did not really exist as a perfection. 
God really exists simply because God is God as proof of God’s existence. 
9. Finally, Seifert’s ninth main contribution to the theory of pure perfections 
is of special significance to Christian philosophy. Based on his understanding of 
love as a pure perfection, Seifert considers it possible to justify, in a purely 
philosophical way, the central claim of Christian revelation that God is “love” 
itself.
40
  
By using better reasons than those proposed by Ariston in the Platonic 
Symposium to prove that love is something divine, Seifert shows that, because 
God is a person and pure perfections in the person can only be fully realised 
through love, God must be love. Besides, God’s absolute and infinite perfection 
means that the creation of the world cannot be understood in terms of God’s 
self-realisation, and only one intelligible way of explaining the free act of 
creation remains: love, which must be identified with the divine essence. 
Josef Seifert has, in fact, made many other contributions to the development 
of the theory of pure perfections. He has proposed, for example, a 
phenomenological and personalistic reading of the Platonic Idea of the Good as 
the sum-total of pure perfections.
41
 He has also offered a valuable assessment of 
Thomas Aquinas’ original contribution to this issue by explaining the Thomistic 
distinction between the name, which expresses a pure perfection, and our finite 
mode of expressing it in language.
42
 However, the nine major contributions are 
considered sufficient to account for the importance and scope of Seifert’s 
investigations on pure perfections. 
 
 
                                                             
40See Seifert, Conocimiento de Dios, 202-213. 
41See Seifert, “The Idea of the Good as the Sum-total of Pure Perfections,” 407-424 
42See Seifert, Essere e Persona, cap. 5, 242-3. 
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III. The “Imperfection” of Seifert’s Theory of Pure Perfections 
 
What remains to be done in terms of perfecting the doctrine of pure perfections? I 
particularly consider a more extensive treatment of two issues to be of paramount 
importance. As far as I know, Josef Seifert has never explicitly addressed the first 
of these issues, at least not adequately. The other issue, however, arises from 
distinctions expressly proposed by Seifert himself. 
1. The first issue refers to the relationship between pure perfection and value. 
As is well known, Seifert follows Hildebrand’s axiology, according to which 
the term value can only be properly applied to “the intrinsically important,” to the 
positive importance of what is intrinsically good and precious. Hildebrand and 
Seifert both distinguish four types of the intrinsically important and, therefore, 
four kinds of specifically distinct values. (1) Qualitative values, which include the 
family of moral values (characterised by the basic and intrinsic importance of 
moral goodness), the domain of the so-called intellectual values (such as 
intellectual acuity, wit, intellectual depth and brilliance), and the realm of 
aesthetic values (centred on the intrinsic importance of beauty). (2) Ontological 
values, that is, values “rooted” or “embodied” in the specific nature of beings. (3) 
The values of perfection or technical values, which are based on the immanent 
perfection of a capacity. (4) The formal value of “being something.”43 
On the one hand, the notion of value or intrinsic importance does not seem to 
                                                             
43See Dietrich von Hildebrand, Ethics (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1972), Part I 
(English original edition: Christian Ethics, New York: David McKay Company, 1953. 
Definitive German edition: Ethik, in D. v. H., Gesammelte Werke, hrsg. von der Dietrich 
von Hildebrand Gesellschaft, (Regensburg-Stuttgart: Josef Habbel-W. Kohlhammer, 
1971-1984, 10 vols., vol. II, 1973) and Ästhetik 1 (Gesammelte Werke, vol. V, 1977). See 
Josef Seifert, Erkenntnis objektiver Wahrheit (Salzburg-München: Universitätsverlag 
Anton Pustet, 19722), 274-290, Was ist und was motiviert eine sittliche 
Handlung? (Salzburg-München: Universitätsverlag Anton Pustet, 1976), “Being and Value. 
Thoughts on the Reform of the Metaphysics of Good within Value Philosophy,” Aletheia I, 
2 (1977), 328-336, “Dietrich von Hildebrands philosophische Entdeckung der 
‘Wertantwort’ und der Grundlegung der Ethik,” Aletheia V (1992), 34-58. See also Rogelio 
Rovira, “On the Manifold Meaning of Value according to Dietrich von Hildebrand and the 
Need for a Logic of the Concept of Value,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 
89 (2015), 115-132. 
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be identical to the notion of pure perfection, to “being better” in such an absolute 
way that it is impossible to surpass it without possessing it. Although all pure 
perfection entails a value, not all-pure perfection is properly a value. Love is, 
according to Josef Seifert, a pure perfection, and it definitely has a value. 
However, love is not properly a value, but an “affective response” to value. 
Moreover, it is also clear that not all value is a pure perfection. The qualitative 
value of the “beauty of the visible and the audible,” for instance, is not a pure 
perfection, and the same is true of intellectual depth, the energy of the will or the 
ontological value of the corporeal living being. 
On the other hand, can there conceivably be a difference between the 
absolute goodness of the intrinsic importance and the absolute goodness of the 
“being better” belonging to the pure perfection? How are we to understand a 
relationship between value and pure perfection, which is different to that of 
identity? Is there really a difference between the goodness or excellence proper to 
value and the goodness or excellence in being? 
In short, we can clearly see that the notion of value and the notion of pure 
perfection do not seem to be identical, yet we cannot see a difference between the 
axiological goodness or positiveness of value and the ontological goodness or 
positiveness of pure perfection. Here we touch on a new aspect of the mystery in 
the relationship between value and being, which deserves further investigation. 
2. The second issue refers to the question of the communicability of pure 
perfections and the incommunicability of the person. 
Josef Seifert accepts Duns Scotus’ thesis that every pure perfection is 
communicable, i.e. shareable by more than one subject.
 
This thesis, however, 
poses a difficult problem for Seifert’s conception of to be a person as pure 
perfection.
44
 Certainly, to be a person always involves incommunicability in 
terms of the individual being, because only a unique being, incommunicable and 
profoundly individual, can be a person. How, then, can to be a person be a pure 
perfection and thus communicable? 
In his response to this objection, Seifert begins by distinguishing between to 
be a person and to be this or that person. The former, but not the latter, is a pure 
perfection, for the essence of the person involves a personal identity and being an 
inalienable, irreplaceable individual, but not being this person instead of that one. 
Seifert then makes a further distinction between pure perfections and 
                                                             
44See Seifert, “Essere persona come perfezione pura,” 68-75.  
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properties, which are neither pure nor mixed perfections. To be this unique person 
rather than another one, Seifert asserts, is neither pure perfection, which it would 
be absolutely better to have than not to have, nor mixed perfection. This 
haecceitas, or uniqueness, is a type of perfection, which, in Seifert’s own words, 
“is beyond the difference between pure and mixed perfection.”45 
Josef Seifert even grants a theological significance to this philosophical 
distinction between pure and mixed perfections on the one hand, and perfections, 
which are beyond this distinction, such as in the above case of specific personal 
identity, on the other hand. He considers it the “key” to a little better 
understanding of the Trinitarian mystery, where no divine person lacks any 
perfection, yet each divine person is distinct from the other.
46
 
Nevertheless, the ontological status of perfections, which are “beyond” the 
difference between pure and mixed perfections, raises some problems. 
What does it mean to be “beyond” the above distinction? On a logical plane, 
we can understand the concept of perfection without taking into account the 
difference between essentially unrestricted perfection and essentially limited 
perfection, in the same way as we can represent the notion of animal without 
regard to the difference of “rational” and “irrational.” However, all animals, 
which actually exist, are necessarily either rational or irrational. Can there really 
be an actual perfection, which is neither capable of infinity nor incapable of 
infinity? Can a perfection, which is by nature “indifferent,” so to speak, to the 
distinction between the infinite and the finite, be predicated of the divine persons? 
Moreover, how can the nature or essence of perfection be characterised, such 
as the individual identity of each specific person, if this perfection is, according to 
Seifert, “beyond” the distinction between pure and mixed perfections? Is the 
essence of this perfection communicable to each person? If so, how can this 
perfection explain the individuality of this particular person? Alternatively, is the 
essence of this perfection, in fact, radically incommunicable? In this case, how 
can we understand its nature as a perfection? Why do we call it perfection? 
The aporia presented by the communicable nature of the pure perfection 
involved in being a person, and the inherent incommunicability of each individual 
person therefore requires further thought. Moreover, theologians must explain a 
further problem: the aporia of the difference between finite persons, who exist in 
                                                             
45Seifert, “Essere persona come perfezione pura,” 71.  
46See Seifert, “Essere persona come perfezione pura,” 72-3.  
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individually different natures, and the divine persons, who exist in one 
numerically indivisible nature. 
Josef Seifert’s analysis on pure perfections is extensive, precise and full of 
deep insights and sharp distinctions. He has recognised, perhaps more than any 
other contemporary philosopher, that these ultimate data of reality play as 
essential a role in metaphysics as the science of being. Moreover, in Seifert’s 
analysis of pure perfections, his astute assessment of the contributions of earlier 
philosophers goes hand in hand, in an exemplary way, with careful attention to 
the things themselves. For all these reasons, Josef Seifert is worthy of the title, I 
am pleased to bestow upon him: Doctor Perfectionum. Seifert’s doctrine of pure 
perfections is clearly not perfect, in the sense of it being complete and finished. It 
is, certainly, perfectibile. As a true philosopher, always attentive to the voice of 
reality, Josef Seifert has not offered us a closed system of thoughts about pure 
perfections. He prefers reality to develop in an ongoing dialogue rather than 
silencing it by trapping it in a system. The example offered by Josef Seifert 
invites us to continue to perfect the theory of pure perfections by hearing the 
voice of reality
